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Fellowship

MAGAZINE OF THE
FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION

JOURNEY'S END: SAN FRANCISCO-MOSCOW PEACE MARCHERS IN RED SQUARE

TWO MAJOR ARTICLES

SIDNEY LENS:

CUBA

a second look

WAR AND PEACE—AND

BERLIN

By Fred Warner Neal

John Davenport GOODBYE, AMERICA

Fellowship

Box 271, Nyack, New York

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In Context 1

Contributors in this Issue 4

Cuba—a Second Look—Sidney Lens 5

Continuing his series of reports on Latin American trouble spots, our special correspondent gives a detailed reassessment of the situation in Cuba since the abortive invasion of last spring. He faces squarely the fact of Cuba's alignment with the Soviet bloc and suggests what the U.S. may still do to restore friendly relations.

Europe in 1962: Peace Seminars 17

Goodbye, America—John H. Davenport 21

A resident of the Eastern Seaboard speaks the fears of many others in his decision to leave his homeland before the bomb comes.

War and Peace—and Berlin—Fred Warner Neal 24

A review of the Berlin situation in its larger context —its historic role in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Who benefits from a policy that would risk all-out-war—when a solution satisfactory to both of the major powers lies within reach?

Books 33

Christmas Peace Poster . . . . . **Back Cover**

A Nativity scene by Robert Regier, with European, Asian and African figures symbolizing its universality for modern man. The three languages represent the major communions—Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox. For the last of these, Russian was chosen instead of Greek as a reminder that Christmas is no respecter of nations.

COVER PHOTO: Sign carried by peace marcher at left reads: "We call upon all peoples immediately to renounce nuclear weapons." Another sign, not shown, called for renunciation of military treaties. Story in September 15 Peace Information Edition. (Photo: Wide World.)

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See inside back cover for list of officers, staff and advisory council. An abbreviated form of the Fellowship's statement of purpose —"That Men May Live"— appears on page 36.

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in context

EDITORIAL COMMENTS
ON THE CURRENT SCENE

BERLIN

There are a number of points in the article by Fred Warner Neal on Berlin, published in this issue, with which pacifists will not agree. Solutions in our day must not be based either on West German interests or American interests, but on the interests of humanity, threatened around the world by nuclear cataclysm. These things aside, however, Professor Neal's article is valuable for the light it sheds on the real issues in Berlin, largely obscured by the tendency of our press to portray the struggle in terms reminiscent of the average TV "Western."

Two things are very clear about Berlin. One is that its freedom cannot be preserved by war. The other is that, as the IFOR statement published recently in FELLOWSHIP pointed out, the Berlin crisis is part of the crisis of Germany and Central Europe, and cannot really be settled in lesser terms. The President's stated willingness to negotiate and his rejection of a rigid position are hopeful signs, as is Mr. Khrushchev's proposal of a neutralized Central Europe. What must be hammered home to both of them, repeatedly and insistently, is that there must be no war. While there is no war, problems may be solved, albeit painfully; war, if it comes, will make all the problems irrelevant. There must be no war!

NEITHER RUN . . .

For an American returning from Europe, September in the United States was a stupefying month. Europeans generally were dismayed by the developing tension over Berlin, but it was controlled dismay, reflecting a fairly widespread opinion that the crisis was largely contrived—a "phony." There was little sign of the near-panic reflected in the American press.

The contrast is not reassuring. The relative calm of the Europeans will not save the world from war; it is with the United States that the decisions rest, and if we are captured by fear, the "phony" crisis can be just as dangerous as a real one. Veterans in the peace movement were steeped in gloom in September: the momentum of the slide down the precipice seemed to have got beyond control, and the times were likened to August 1939.

The gloom has lifted slightly as both sides have shown signs of recoiling from the abyss, but it has only lifted, not disappeared. An increasing number of thoughtful Americans are very close to hopelessness about the future. John Davenport, whose "Goodbye, America" appears in this issue, is one of those Americans. The obstacles in the way of averting nuclear war seem to him to be beyond surmounting in time. Abandoning hope of persuading his country

NEW TYPE TO STAY —NEW PAPER TO COME

Results of our experiment with new paper and larger type in the September 1 issue indicate an overwhelming vote for the new on both counts. All articles in this issue are set in the larger type. To accommodate our printer, however, we are continuing with the old paper until stock is used up, but will change permanently to the new paper beginning with our January issue. We want to thank the many readers who participated in making this decision.—The Editors.

to take a different course, he seeks to find a place where his own family's chance of safety will be greater.

His decision recalls Bruno Bettelheim's recent consideration of the Jews who perished under Hitler. Many of them could have fled, Bettelheim observed, but they did not. Their identification with their way of life and their homes and possessions was strengthened by an inability really to believe that such terrible things could happen, and they stayed to their death. The same considerations may well apply today. John Davenport and the others who are following his example obviously believe that they do.

No glib dissent from their argument is possible. Civilizations have perished before in man's history, and many of the signs of disintegration are apparent in ours. In the kind of holocaust that threatens us, the new factor is the element of instantaneous slaughter of millions of people, in a fashion that robs life and death alike of meaning, as Hans Morgenthau observed in *Commentary* recently. Why should not individuals who so read the handwriting on the wall seek the nearest exit while there is still time?

Yet dissent there must be. Some Jews did escape from Hitler, and conceivably six million might have fled to some kind of haven, but in 1961 running is no solution. There is literally no place to run for safety; the atom is a world problem, and no one can predict what would remain when the bombs and the fallout had finished.

Our only safety is in the abandonment of war, and the abandonment of war is still possible. History does not have to repeat itself. New elements create the possibility of new results, and the new element now is the sense of urgency among ordinary people. Will it be enough? Will peace become the first order of business for enough people to turn the world onto a safer path?

No one can say. For some, peace has become the first order of business, but they still are far from enough. If it were to become the first order of business for just the 12,000 members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, as it has become for the peace walkers, and Earle Reynolds, and the two young men who dragged a "peace trailer" behind them across the country, the results might be astonishing.

There is no place to run. There are a thousand places to work.

. . . NOR HIDE

Another indication of at least incipient panic in this country is the new concern about fallout shelters. Such shelters make no more sense today than they did a few months ago when public apathy toward them was thick enough to slice. The sudden upsurge of interest that reportedly has building contractors whistling and Federal CD officials beaming happily, is simply a measure of the extent to which Americans have lost faith in the ability of their government to secure peace. Put another way, it is a measure of the recognized failure of the deterrence policy; most people no longer expect safety from the "balance of terror" and are grasping for whatever straws are available.

Worth noting, incidentally, is that in mid-September not a single member of the Cabinet or the National Security Council had built a shelter for his own family.

NEIGHBORS

Speaking of shelters, we have at hand an OCDM leaflet entitled "Introduction to Civil Defense of Churches," which concludes with these words:

> "At Religious Affairs conferences in the OCDM Staff College, individual clergymen often remark that there are many facets of civil defense which provide practical opportunities for the exercise of moral virtue taught by the Church.
>
> "Strengthening family ties through home preparedness, and love of neighbor through

community disaster planning, are two examples that are often cited. There have been a number of excellent sermons inspired by such themes. Excerpts from some of these have been collected under the general heading of *Excerpts From Sermons on Civil Defense,* available on request to those who may be interested."

Some more examples of the practical opportunities to express love of neighbor through Civil Defense have been coming to light recently. CD directors have urged householders who build fallout shelters to be sure to equip them with guns in order to repel the unprepared wretches from next door. A Nevada CD official proposed a 5,000-man militia to fight off refugees from Southern California, and a California CD coordinator warned the citizens of Beaumont to be prepared to shoot down those fleeing from bombed Los Angeles. "There's nothing in the Christian ethic," he is reported to have said, "which denies one's right to protect oneself and one's family."

It may be that another sermon is needed.

"TODAY I DID"

In Austin, Texas, lives a hardware dealer named Charles Davis, who has won a species of immortality through having been photographed with his family in his fallout shelter, with his guns and grim look both prominently displayed. The picture, in two-column width, was published in the "Religion" section of *Time.*

At about the same time that the Davis family were being photographed, Mrs. Otto Hofmann was also hard at work in Austin. Mrs. Hofmann was writing a long, thoughtful letter to the President, with copies to Adlai Stevenson and a list of publications. The letter was a plea for more creative approaches to the problem of peace. One of the things that distinguished it is that Mrs. Hofmann is herself a refugee from East Germany and the daughter of one of Hitler's victims. Her letter ended with these paragraphs:

"My children are clamoring for attention. This afternoon I have neglected them. But as I reflect upon this fact I feel that I have, perhaps, done them a greater service than had I played with them. I believe that I have invested these hours in their future. I do not want them some day, when it is too late, to sit in judgment of me and rightly to accuse me:

> "'As a free citizen in a free country, why did you not speak up? The President had requested your suggestions. Why did you not accept his challenge? You knew, as few American citizens did, what happens to a people who will accept their government's policies without voicing their objections, and loudly and clearly. You told us how our grandmother was deported, and killed. As we grew older you explained that such crimes against humanity came to pass because people had not spoken up in protest while there was still time. As we understand it, it was too late to object when the gas chambers were being built. But when the H-bombs were constructed, poison gases developed, medical doctors, in defiance of the Hippocratic oath they once took, helped produce materials for use in biological warfare, when the use of all these instruments of death was threatened, YOU KNEW ABOUT ALL THIS!
>
> "'You had us get polio shots; you had us vaccinated. You spared no efforts to give us a happy childhood. You provided us with a clean home and with a healthy diet. But the milk you urged us to drink was radioactively contaminated! Why did you not realize that, while you contributed to the cancer fund, you also, by your silence, contributed to the *creation* of cancer through the testing of nuclear bombs?
>
> "'You knew the horrors of war. It was your duty, in a free society, to voice your concern and your protest, not only among your friends but where the people responsible for shaping the destiny of our country would hear you.
>
> "'Your parents and their generation, in Germany, as we understand it, did not speak up because they were "to busy," or because they were afraid of losing their jobs. You knew that this lack of courage later cost them first their freedom and then their lives.
>
> "'You put Eichmann on trial without recognizing that you were hardly less guilty than he was, because you stood silently by and watched while the gas chambers of the atomic age were being built, gas chambers large enough to kill every human being on earth. Why did you not speak up?'

"Today I did."

TESTS

Since FELLOWSHIP has so few readers in the Soviet Union, and since criticism of Soviet policies and actions does not lack for airing in this country, we usually devote little space to reassuring our readers that our distaste for the war-making proclivities of governments applies to that country as well as our own. With the extraordinarily cynical act of the Soviets in resuming nuclear testing, however, and on a scale that demonstrates beyond argument that preparations had gone on during the test-ban conferences, there is a special situation. We believe that a flood of direct protests from all over the world should go to Premier Khrushchev, and we hope that FELLOWSHIP readers will swell that flood substantially.

At the same time, we hope they will also bring all possible pressure to bear in this country to persuade the President not to follow through on his reported plan to resume atmospheric tests here. We have already lost a great moral advantage in resuming underground testing. To follow this by new atmospheric tests would be, of course, further to increase the danger from radioactive fallout. But it would also mean the complete erosion of any remaining moral stand that we have. It would be infinitely better to cease all testing and challenge the Soviet Union to follow our example.

Earle Reynolds embarks for protest voyage into Soviet port

CONTRIBUTORS IN THIS ISSUE

Sidney Lens continues in this issue his series of incisive reports on Latin America begun in September. Through a misunderstanding, we announced at that time that we would publish his articles on Mexico and Venezuela at this time. For Venezuela please substitute Nicaragua; the article will appear in our next issue. Meanwhile, the fast pace of events in Cuba brooks no delay. News from there soon becomes history. Mr. Lens' article in this issue tries—with great success, we think—to hold both together in the same perspective.

John H. Davenport has been a member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation since 1939 and worked with the original CORE group in Chicago in 1942. We publish his "Goodbye, America" not because we want to encourage anyone to emulate him, but because his decision, so eloquently stated, is symptomatic of a part of the American state of mind that has received little attention elsewhere. Mr. Davenport is employed by International Business Machines, has an M.A. in political science, is married and has four sons. He is a member of the Religious Society of Friends.

Fred Warner Neal is currently serving as Fulbright Professor at the Institute des Sciences Politiques in Paris. A former Washington correspondent for the *Wall Street Journal*, he has been a U.S. State Department consultant on Russian Affairs. "War and Peace—and Berlin" is adapted from an address he gave at the Claremont Graduate School, where he holds a professorship in international relations and government. Copies of the original text are available at 10¢ each from Fellowship Publications, Box 271, Nyack, N. Y. Needless to say, Prof. Neal's views are his own and at certain points obviously do not reflect the pacifist viewpoint of this magazine.

CUBA
a second look

BY SIDNEY LENS

HISTORY IN THIS ISLAND PARADISE, once stagnant and irrelevant, is no longer written in decades or years, but months. In the eight months since my last visit in December 1960, much has remained the same—far more in fact than I expected—but much has changed dramatically. Cuba is a beehive of activity, unlike anywhere else in Latin America. As the bell captain at the Havana Libre Hotel puts it proudly: "There's no *mañana* in Cuba any more."

Evaluating the developments of these eight months is no simple matter, for there are currents and cross currents that lead in opposing directions. Perhaps the salient fact is that the Cuban revolution is entering a third, uncharted phase. The first was the struggle for power in which the middle class and the peasants united behind Castro against Batista and his American allies. The second, beginning with mid-1959, was the rupture between these two classes resulting from a speed-up of revolutionary change. In this phase, Castro jettisoned his promises of political democracy to the middle class but initiated a highly attractive program of economic and social reform for the eighty percent of the population that is worker and peasant. Now, in the third period, harassed by invasion, embargoes and a startling changeover in trade and economy, the basic humanism of the revolution confronts bureaucratic and dogmatic challenges.

In December 1960 the direction of Cuba was not entirely clear; there was still a residual hope that a rapprochement could be worked out with the incoming Kennedy Administration and that the revolution might thereby lessen its travail. That avenue has now been closed; Cuba has become part of the Soviet bloc, undergoing a major transition in economy and ideology.

For those whose values pivot around the Cold War, this circumstance closes the book on Cuba. It is now a communist country, therefore a totalitarian dictatorship, therefore an enemy of freedom, progress, and the United States. Such simplistic estimates, however, give us few insights into the actual dynamic of Cuba, its real meaning to 6.8 million *people*, its potential for the future. For despite its adhesion to communism there are unique features surrounding today's Cuba:

1. This is the first time in all history that a "Communist revolution" is being led by *non*-Communists. The Communists in fact find it difficult to rationalize their theory of being a "vanguard" party, for it has been the non-Communist July 26th people who have guided the revolution ever since 1956.

2. This is the only communist country which has a true "people's army"—the 700,000 militia members. No other communist regime could survive a week if it dared to put weapons in the hands of ten percent of its people.

3. The basic humanism of Castro's revolution, though more challenged than in December, remains predominant.

4. The special position of Cuba, ninety miles from the United States, and so dependent on the good will of Latin America, forces it in the direction of non-alignment. Cuba's participation in the Cairo and Belgrade neutralist conferences is no accident or "trick" but a necessity of its circumstances.

5. Castro and the Cubans, like Tito and Mao, have made their *own* revolution and are bound to be more independent than the so-called peoples' democracies that were established by Russian bayonets.

None of this alters the fact that Cuba is under pressure from dogmatic and bureaucratic tendencies. But the issue is far from resolved and meanwhile the humanist characteristics of the early revolution are still present and continue to evoke an almost revivalist enthusiasm. It is entirely possible—though far from assured—that Cuba may yet evolve its own form of radicalism, quite different from that of the Soviet world, on the one hand, or the neutralist world—Egypt, Ghana, India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia—on the other. To close the book on Cuba would be just as much a mistake today as in 1960 or 1959.

The Cuban Misalliance With Russia

CUBA'S ENTRY INTO the communist bloc, the outstanding change of this year, is a tragedy of American policy that few Americans are willing to assess. Our "conventional wisdom" insists that "Castro was always a secret Communist anyway." Obsessed with militarism, we continue to think in a Cold War framework, seldom putting ourselves in the shoes of the Cubans. But for Castro there was, in practical terms, no other alternative.

After the United States had entirely cut off the purchase of Cuban sugar and broken diplomatic relations, what were the Cubans to do? Sugar is eighty percent of their exports; they must find a market for it or starve. Even assuming that Castro was "always a secret Communist"—a ludicrous assumption since the Communists opposed him until six weeks before he came to power—he certainly is no fool. It takes six hours to deliver food or industrial supplies from Tampa, Florida; twenty-two days from the Soviet Union. There are thousands of items the Cuban city dweller is accustomed to that can be supplied by the United States, but not by Russia. The story is told that when "Che" Guevara presented a list of Cuban needs to Soviet economic authorities, the first item was "women's deodorant." The Russian interpreter was nonplussed; there evidently is no equivalent term in Russian and no supply of the commodity.

Furthermore, shifting from trade with the United States to trade with the Soviet bloc was a towering task that no one would undertake lightly. In 1958 total Cuban imports from the Soviet Union were nil—a mere eighty-eight dollars—but from the United States $500 million. Each year Cuba bought $150 million in foodstuffs from

he U.S.—wheat, flour, fruits, lard, egetables, canned meat, evaporated nilk—and millions more from the dol- ar area, such as beans from Mexico. f Cuba needed a spare part for a ractor or a sugar mill, a phone call was made to Miami and the part was n its way within hours. If a machine broke down, an engineer in Miami ould take the next plane to supervise epairs. Cutting off trade with the United States meant not only that Cuba would have to search arduously the highways and byways of world markets for substitutes, but she would have to warehouse tens of millions of dollars of goods and find thousands of new technicians.

Only a stupid leader would have deliberately courted such a total changeover of economic direction—and Castro is not stupid. I know that as late as January 1961 his government sent a secret message to a high American official proposing resumption of diplomatic relations and payment for seized American property in long-term bonds. Instead of heeding this call, unfortunately, the Kennedy administration moved full steam ahead to the April invasion by Cuban exiles.

Cuba's Disillusionment With U.S.

The invasion closed the door on Castro. It pushed Cuba ideologically, economically and psychologically into the Soviet camp. It froze the attitudes of its people. A dozen non-Communist intellectuals I know in Havana, who were once critical of such Soviet acts as the 1956 intervention in Hungary, no longer are concerned about Russian derelictions. "If it weren't for Russia," one of them said, "I wouldn't be alive today." A friend of mine who had treated the wounded during the three-day invasion told me: "I'm a doctor and I'm supposed to be hardened to pain. But I cried every minute while I patched up the men wounded by your invasion force. I will never forget or forgive that act." Eight months ago she was definitely non-communist, neutralist. Now she is an ardent Soviet patriot. "If it weren't for Russian military mobilization on April 17," she told me, "you Americans would have sent in planes and Marines." I didn't agree with this estimate, but there was no arguing with my friend; she was thoroughly disillusioned with the United States.

All of Cuba is disillusioned, and Castro has decided that his nation can survive only by tying itself to Russia firmly and unequivocally. The signs at the airport and elsewhere now read: "Cuba, first socialist country in America"; and by socialism Castro does not mean the Egyptian, Yugoslav or British Labor Party variety. The *Internationale* today is sung more frequently in Cuba than in the Soviet Union, and a Swiss correspondent tells me that he has seen more people buying books on Marxism in two months in Havana than in the eight years he spent in Belgrade and Warsaw. In every ministry, farm, factory there are hurry-up classes in Marxist theory, usually with a member of the Communist party (the Popular Socialist Party) giving the instruction. So frenzied is this theoretical changeover in fact that the Communists are importing members from Latin America, and in some cases Europe, to do the teaching.

For their part, the Soviets have thrown themselves into the task of saving Cuba's economy with a vigor that few people appreciate. In the last year and a half the Communist bloc

has granted $350 million in credits on the most favorable terms—usually ten-year loans at 2½ percent, with payments to begin after the new factories are in actual production. The Chinese, never to be outdone by the Russians, have granted $60 million, no interest, no time limit on payments; for practical purposes it is a gift. In addition, of course, the Soviet bloc is buying four million tons of sugar at slightly above the world price, and is paying for about one-fifth of it in valuable dollars. This year Cuba had the second largest sugar cane production in history, despite the invasion; if it weren't for Soviet help, that cane would rot and Cuba's citizens would starve. What is more, the Russians cock a wary eye to help in any emergency. When the United States confiscated a lard shipment headed for Cuba the Russians immediately ordered 10,000 tons sent to the island. And the Chinese followed suit with another 10,000.

Whether the communist world can maintain this pace of economic help remains to be seen. But after the four-year industrial plan, beginning next year, Cuba will be on much firmer ground, able to do with less help. Present steel capacity is 200,000 tons. By the end of this decade it is expected to rise to two million, or about one-half the per capita production in the United States. This in itself will be a sizable achievement if it comes off. In addition the Russians, Czechs, Chinese, East Germans and Poles are sending in dozens of complete factories. The list is impressive: from Russia a 200,000-kilowatt electric generating plant, another for 100,000 kilowatts, an oil refinery, an ammonia factory, two nitric acid factories, two fertilizer plants, one paper mill, and so on. From Poland one steel milling plant, one citric acid plant, one shipyard, one malleable iron foundry, etc., etc. From Czechoslovakia a door lock factory, a home appliance shop, a shovel plant, a bicycle factory, a pencil plant, a diesel motor plant. Even Yugoslavia is sending a ketchup and tomato juice factory. By 1965 Cuba expects to be self-sufficient in foods and even to export such items as meat. Its gross national product is expected to rise to approximately $5 billion—a rise of about ten percent a year. It will build 100,000 small homes for its population; will be assembling ninety percent of its autos, trucks and tractors; and will considerably improve living standards, already twenty-five percent above their 1958 levels.

From all appearances the economy is not faring too badly. The national budget this year is $1.1 billion, of which $600 million is raised from profits of state industries. A symptom of the situation is the earnings from oil and gasoline products. The former private owners used to sell $160 million a year, earning a $3-million dividend. Sales are approximately the same now—all autos are still running—but profits have risen to $40 million. A government official attributed this to the fact that Cuba is buying oil and other raw materials more cheaply from the communist bloc, and is using many facilities that were formerly idle. Sugar production has gone up by a million tons from 1957; tobacco by about forty percent. Rice is up from 225,900 tons in 1958 to 375,700 this year; tomatoes almost fifty percent; potatoes ten per cent; meat from 169,700 tons to 207,000.

Hardships of Transition

The critical period for Cuba is these next few years. The transition is a painful process, with all kinds of shortages piling up. There is no lard. Meat, beans, rice, eggs, evaporated milk, poultry are scarce. Such commodities as razor blades, soap flakes, women's sanitary napkins, bottle openers, tooth paste and scores of others are difficult to purchase. Most of the problem stems from the United States embargo

Though the United Nations Charter provides that food and medicinal sales may not be cut off by any UN member, the fact is that trade between the United States and Cuba has come to a virtual halt. Even medicines are being held up on one technicality after another.

Another factor in the shortages, however, is increased consumption, especially in the villages. Castro claims that the national wage bill has gone up by $500 million due to wage increases in 1959 and increased employment in subsequent years. In an economy whose gross national product is only $3.6 billion, that is a sizable sum. Finally, many goods are in short supply because of a breakdown in the distribution system. The state engaged in a running battle last year with middlemen; every time it placed controls on certain prices, the wholesalers resisted strongly. Thereupon the government took over this function itself, eliminating the middlemen entirely. The result has been a bad administrative foul-up; the young, inexperienced government officials either do not have the incentive or the know-how to do the job as well as their private predecessors. My feeling is that the regime probably was too hasty in making this transition. Be that as it may, however, the poor distribution of commodities adds to the difficulties.

Shoppers Confront Shortages

Everywhere in Cuba today queues are forming and the poor housewife spends two or three hours running from store to store to fill her larder. In downtown Havana I watched a truck laden with evaporated milk stop between two grocery stores. A line formed immediately at the one closest by, but when the driver began to deliver at the other store there was a mad rush surrounding the unfortunate store owner, who refused to start selling until there was an orderly queue.

Our press at home and our officials view these shortages with glee, convinced that each difficulty is a nail in Castro's coffin. Nothing could be so short-sighted. During the first days of the lard shortage, after we seized a large shipment in the United States, posters appeared saying "No lard, but we won't be slaves." The signs were propaganda, of course, but their theme was voiced a thousand times by the housewife. The woman who waited hour after hour for her family's groceries more often blamed the *Yanquis* for her inconvenience than Castro.

Some months ago there was a shortage of cork and the breweries were unable to cap their beer bottles. Our mass media played on this hardship with a total lack of understanding. In four months the country was able to replenish its cork supplies and beer is now in greater supply than ever. Matches were of poor quality and wouldn't light; that too has been solved, as the government finds substitute materials for one item after another.

Our wish, unfortunately, is father to our thought. We forget that we Americans also had shortages during the war and no one dreamt of making a revolution against the government. In England rations were even harder to come by, but no one thought of rebellion. And in Cuba there have always been shortages, in peacetime as well as in war. Material difficulties sometimes make people more, rather than less, patriotic. The Cubans today have a feeling of *nationhood* and dignity such

as they have never experienced in their history. A tool-and-die maker who used to earn $3.50 an hour in a New Jersey Bendix plant now earns $7 a day in Havana. He is one of about 250 a month who are returning to Cuba from the United States "to serve the revolution." "If the Russians," he says, "could survive Stalingrad, we can survive a lard or meat shortage."

Revolutions don't die because of shortages of meat or bottle openers. To believe that is to fail to understand the *psychological* transformation of Cuba. Today's Cuban feels a solid empathy with his government. Even if he does not vote in political elections and cannot organize opposition parties he knows that it is doing something for *him*.

Widespread Benefits for Workers

Despite all the hardships of economic changeover, the humanistic impulses were still prevalent in August 1961. Thousands of new homes were still being built for the city and village poor. Hundreds of workers' centers were going up everywhere. The beaches and beach clubs, once the exclusive property of the rich, have been nationalized and are used gratis by the poor. Three thousand new schoolrooms have been built in eight months. A hundred thousand city youngsters, twelve to eighteen years old, have been sent to the villages to live with peasants and teach them reading and writing. I might note parenthetically that these young people were not, as our press intimated, torn from their mothers' bosoms, indoctrinated, and sent to the hinterlands by a harsh state. Each student had to have his father's signature to be enrolled; he could leave the literacy corps any time he pleased; and he could be sent only to the village chosen by his parents. The young girls I interviewed at Varadero gave the figures of how many of their classmates had availed themselves of the opportunity. In one case it was two out o seventeen, in another twenty-one o twenty-eight, and so on. The picture o overriding compulsion carried by ou press was another figment of an over zealous newspaperman's imagination And while the city young were going to the villages, thousands of village youth were being brought to Havana put up at the Riviera or Havana Libre hotels or at posh homes in Miramar, t study cooking, sewing, technical trades

At a seisal cooperative which visited—unannounced and unexpected incidentally—there was a small dairy supplying 300 liters of milk every day to 300 families, something unheard o before the revolution. Eighteen worker were being given a six-month course in history and other subjects—heavily laden with propaganda, no doubt, bu it was their first taste of higher learning. What is more, they were being paid full wages in the six months a school. The workers in the rope factory, attached to the co-op, earned $2.4 a day before the revolution, $3.40 now and last year they received $65 each a their part of the profit-sharing. All o them were now working twelve month a year, rather than three, four or five And they had elected a technical advisory committee that gave them a sense of power and pride, whether o not it functioned well.

A resident of a town called Cidra related to me some incidents of the past. "We used to have five small suga mills here," he said, "until Hershey came in and put them out of business Hershey processed the cane in a large mill many miles from here. Our workers were thrown out of work but no body ever cared about the people o this town before." Now they are al working, the streets are being paved sidewalks put in, flowers and tree planted to beautify the town, hundred of new homes erected. The citizens o Cidra are not likely to turn allegiance overnight because they are short o

meat or soap flakes. Their lives, running back a dozen generations, have been lives of shortages and hunger; they are willing to wait while the government remedies the problem and they are convinced that their tribulations are temporary.

When I discussed the shortages with an elderly pacifist leader, the head of the United Nations Association, Dr. Ofelia Dominguez, she said: "If you had seen Cuba for sixty years, with no food for kids in the villages, no medicines, no work—you too would be revolutionary."

A Fidelista Behind Bars

At the jail in Cardenas I interviewed a number of prisoners and the new warden. They hadn't expected me because I took an automobile and stopped at random wherever I pleased. I asked a narcotics addict whether he was a *Fidelista.* He said he was. "How can you be a *Fidelista,*" I joshed him, "when the government has put you in jail?" He pointed to the improvement in the prison administration. The guards no longer carry billies. Prisoners are permitted to go to the beach on occasion—and without guards. Twenty-five of the eighty-seven men have been sent off to collective farms to work out their terms—without any guards to watch or control them. "One thing has nothing to do with the other," said the narcotic. "This government is trying to do things. I was in jail under Batista too, and believe me it's a lot different."

On the plane back to Mexico I sat next to an American who had been jailed for two days by Batista. He was far from being a *Fidelista* but he too recited the difference in attitude of the old regime and the present.

These were not political prisoners, mind you, and I don't know from personal knowledge how these latter fare. But the humanism of the Cuban revolution—whether or not it is now in the communist camp—is something that cannot be disparaged. Take the case of Adolfo Delgado—a peasant in the People's Farm in Pedro Betancourt whom I also interviewed at random. Before the revolution, he said, he earned $600 a year, working as a day laborer during the harvest seasons in different farms. Now he earns $120 a month, works a full year in the People's Farm Camilo Cienfuegos, has a new concrete home—one of the 150 built there—pays nothing for water or electricity, gets free medical care (the doctor comes every Sunday), and pays only 10¢ for a liter of milk. "There may be a shortage of meat," he said, "but I've eaten more meat in the last fifteen days than I ate in any year before. If they want to destroy this revolution they will have to kill everyone of us. We will die for it."

Three years ago 700,000 people were out of work in Cuba; now there is virtually no joblessness in the villages and perhaps 200,000 or 250,000 unemployed in all. There were 18,000 schoolrooms before; now 33,000. I myself saw at least a dozen military barracks that had been converted to schools. The former barracks at what is now Liberty City is being made over into a beautiful school. Dozens of expensive homes in Miramar are now technical and art schools. In the past, forty percent of all consumption was in Havana, with only fifteen percent of the population; today there is a far more equitable distribution of the national largesse. The gross product this year will rise by ten to twelve percent, from $3.2 to $3.6 billion.

Above all, there is no question that the government is still honest and incorruptible. I met no one, not even the few counter-revolutionaries with whom I spoke, who feel that Castro is enriching himself or that it is possible to bribe a government official. On the contrary there is a spirit of dedication which if anything is even greater than in December; the typical official is working three-quarters around the clock and doing a stint as a militiaman a few hours a week besides.

Militia Grows, Army Declines

The psychological support for the revolution is nowhere better evidenced than in the militia. Since I was there in December the number of militiamen and women has increased from 400,000 to 700,000. The army and city police have been proportionately downgraded, while the people's army takes over many of their functions. No doubt there are a few militiamen who have been forced into the ranks by threat of job loss. I had a long talk with one chap who was resisting such pressure. But I'm convinced that the number is small. These are true volunteers; they work their regular work day and guard the cities and villages in their off-hours. They receive no pay, no emoluments for their efforts. If they serve it can only be because of their pride in the revolution and their determination to defend it at all costs. You can see it in their behavior. All of Havana is an armed camp, with militiamen at almost every door. But one feels safer walking the streets at night than on the South Side in my native Chicago. There is nothing military about these people, except their guns. They are not arrogant, they don't drink on duty, almost never have an accident with their weapons. I am opposed to militarism of any kind, but I must say that if we have to have armed men the Cuban militia is the most preferable form I can think of. These are dedicated people for whom the revolution has meant a new beginning, a new life.

It is this sense of *belonging* that accounts for Castro's popularity. In August 1961 as in December 1960 at least seventy percent of the people supported the regime enthusiastically—particularly in the villages. In a town called Cardenas the driver of my car stopped to see some relatives. They didn't know I was in the car or who I was, but when he left they asked him when he would be back. "I'm awfully busy these days," he said, "I don't know when I'll be in Cardenas again."

"Well," said one of his relatives, "if you're working for the revolution that's okay."

Such faith in the revolution is something that no one can describe, unless he has been to Cuba. Until Castro, Cuban society was a closed one. The twenty percent who were middle and upper class were imbued with a class superiority that we do not know in the United States. They were contemptuous of workers, peasants, and above all the one-third of the population that is Negro. Now, rightly or wrongly, the lower classes feel it is *their* farms, *their* factories, *their* government.

There is, of course, no freedom of the press, no freedom of association, no political democracy as we know it. Suppression of freedom of the press has extended as far as the confiscation of the plates of Leon Trotsky's *Permanent Revolution* by the Ministry of Labor, one of the first government agencies to be infiltrated by the Communists. The Trotskyist newspaper,

Worker's Voice, has also been outlawed —a fact that is especially ironic since his "counter-revolutionary" paper has consistently supported the Castro regime, offering only minor criticisms. Nor is this the only example. But the picture of unabated terror we get from our mass media just does not hold water. There are no mass arrests, no wholesale terror and, from all credible reports, no torture of prisoners. Even the remaining members of the middle class are not living in the dire fear we visualize. Any night in the gambling casinos you can find hundreds and hundreds of shopkeepers and former members of the elite playing $50 and $100 on a single turn of the roulette wheel or at blackjack. The vast majority of tradesmen are still private enterpreneurs, and there are 130,000 private landowners who till more than half the arable land.

To have pushed such a society into the Soviet camp is a first-class error that the United States will take years living down. Perhaps the most distressing moments of my trip were two separate conversations I had with Americans presently living in Cuba. Both had been socialists in the United States, both were not only non-Communist but anti-Communist, both had decided—after the invasion—that the destiny of humanity lies with the Communist camp. "Up to now," one of them said, "I saw only one side of the story. But living here I see the other side as well, and it's clear that the Russians are right in all the disputes between the two power blocs—Cuba, Laos, the Congo, probably even Berlin." When I brought up the matter of Hungary in 1956 he said he still opposed such intervention bitterly, "but this was the dying gasp of Stalinism in Russia. I don't think it will happen again. Meanwhile the United States is moving backward, Russia forward."

The Rocky Road Ahead

THE TWO FLIES in Cuba's ointment are first of all the danger of external intervention, and secondly the dangers of internal bureaucracy. Cuba's response to the first is to woo both the Communist world and Latin America. It follows a policy of non-alignment—sometimes even voting against Russia in the United Nations—because it needs Latin support almost as much as it needs Russian. Cubans are confident that the *Fidelista* revolution will sweep the hemisphere. They expect changes in their direction in Venezuela within a year, in Colombia and in Chile somewhat later. They feel that Mexico and Argentina will vigorously defend the Cuban right to self-determination. I may be wrong, but my own feeling is that this strategy will probably succeed, that the chances of direct U.S. intervention are small and that attempts at invasion by the counter-revolution are doomed to failure under present circumstances.

The significant danger, I feel, is internal. The revolution has been an unparalleled success thus far because it has been consistently humanistic. It has appealed to and stirred personal initiative as nothing I have seen anywhere in the world. The enthusiasm and dedication of the masses has made it possible to reshape a whole nation. As I write these words that feeling is at its height. But many intellectuals inside Cuba recognize that it cannot continue indefinitely. You cannot expect people to put in a hard day's work, spend a few hours on guard duty, and a few hours more waiting in line for short foodstuffs, and still continue the same peaks of morale. For the moment, the hostility against the American invasion buoys the Cuban spirit. Yankee obtuseness has given Castro a gratuitous

weapon for forging unity. But even that cannot be played too long or too far. The span of enthusiasm of a Latin is seldom long, and in Cuba it has already far exceeded its expectancy. When it begins to flag, the state will have two alternatives: either it will offer attractive money incentives and democratic participation in running industry—which it is not doing now —or it will use its centralized power to control, perhaps even terrorize, the masses.

As the Cuban revolution enters its third historical phase, both tendencies are evident. The armed militia is of course the biggest barrier to total bureaucratization. When it begins to demoralize and fragment, the state will be in a crisis and unless the state can continue improving conditions, as it has, there is always that danger.

Petty Abuses of Power

Nonetheless I have a distinct impression that bureaucratic tendencies are growing. All kinds of mediocre men who never tasted power before are throwing their weight around. At the airport when I left, there was a tall female member of the secret police, G-2, who sent shivers down my spine. She locked the door on us for 3½ long hours while we went through customs, and when one of us tried to talk with someone on the other side of the glass doors she had a near fit. Every few minutes she and her confrère called someone in to a separate room for private interrogation, probably search. Though customs was scheduled to begin at 6 A.M. and the plane to leave at 8:30 A.M., our secret police friend came in a half hour late and delayed proceedings until an hour and a half beyond take-off time. I am sure that G-2 is committing many errors and holding not a few people in jail who should be out. I heard of at least three cases where citizens were imprisoned wrongly and then released—after eight hours in one instance, a day in another, and I don't know how long in the third. Many no doubt are less lucky because there are as yet no civil courts for political prisoners, and the Supreme Court that was disbanded at the end of last year has not been replaced.

On the negative side too was a marked increase in adulation for Fidel Castro personally, something that was underplayed last December. There were thousands of signs in the July 26 parades praising Fidel, deifying him beyond the level of a mere mortal political leader.

The bureaucratic mind is evident, even more seriously, in the press. All six newspapers are of one mold with not a line of dissent in any of them. Not even a critical letter to the editor is permitted. Most of the young journalists and writers of Cuba would like to change this situation, but the mood established by the tight Communist group that controls the "base of organization" is a dogmatic one. Recently ICAIC, the art and cinema institution, banned a ten-minute film called "P.M." on the grounds it showed a few drunken Negroes at the waterfront. Immediately the intellectuals—who are overwhelmingly non-Communist—raised a fuss. Castro himself decided to meet with them and investigate the dispute. After about twenty hours of meetings, stretching over three days, Fidel gave his opinion that the banning was a mistake and that dissent, while it could not be permitted in the mass media, was to be encouraged in the literary magazines and in books. Nonetheless, even armed with this mandate, the intelligentsia does not find the courage to criticize in print.

No Airing of Mistakes

The mood of the nation is so tight and the Communist dogmatic spirit so advanced that the tendency to dissent is warped. After Castro's speech, *Lunes*, the top literary magazine, published

long articles on the garbled history of Viet Nam and Korea, rather than a little criticism of shortcomings within Cuba. The result is that mistakes do not reach public scrutiny and correction is often long and arduous. One intellectual excused the lack of criticism on the ground that "if we admitted the errors that INRA (the economic organization) had made in planting new crops, it would cause so much dissension among our people that it would divide our people and give the counter-revolution ammunition." This is the rationale that the Communists inject into the thinking processes of the country. When I pointed out that in Russia after the first war and three years of civil war, Lenin permitted fourteen organized factions in the Communist Party, most people still dismissed the idea of dissent with the observation that "we are only ninety miles from the United States."

The institutions for top-down control are ready and waiting. A few months ago the regime established on each block a "Committee for the Defense of the Revolution." These groups pinpointed the opponents of the revolution and no doubt were responsible for most of the 50,000 arrests during the invasion. Since April the Defense Committees have regressed in their semi-police functions and are now primarily an institution for registering people for lard rationing, decorating the streets for festive occasions, and similar functions. The trade unions, once decentralized and filled with lively dissent, are now thoroughly controlled by the Communists, and their main function is to boost production. The technical advisory committees as yet do not play the kind of vibrant role that workers' councils play in Yugoslavia. The cooperative farms and the people's farms —almost one-half of the agricultural land—are still fully controlled by INRA, with no effective countervailing power.

Trend Toward Rule From the Top

At the moment, none of this overrides the humanism of the revolution, but I went away with the uneasy feeling that the trend was to more top-down rule, rather than to lessening controls. Almost all non-communist Cubans pointed out that dissent was a necessary ingredient of politics and they expect that when pressures ease, Cuba will flower with it. The editor of a newspaper who rejected a friendly Fellowship of Reconciliation advertisement stated quite frankly that "we're not strong enough to publish an ad that has even as little criticism as this one has."

One of the severe dangers of the growth of dogmatism is its effect on tradesmen and farmers. As noted, the majority of trade and a small majority of agriculture is still in private hands. On July 26, Castro assured these men that they would not be nationalized for many years to come. But they can hardly function well if the atmosphere is threatening. The tradesmen and small factory owners refuse to invest in their properties if they feel there is a danger of being unceremoniously uprooted. The farmers too cannot work at their best if state pressures continue to accelerate.

Eight months ago, bureaucracy was not so burning a problem; there was still a chance that American pressures would abate and the revolution could proceed in a more relaxed fashion. Today the die is cast and the state must either find some means both of enlarging incentive and confining dogmatism, or find itself pushed inexor-

ably towards totalitarianism. The Communists, I am convinced, are a formidable force in that direction, for their influence derives primarily from their positions in the bureaus—not from mass adulation. It is significant that despite their great power they have not held a single mass meeting since Castro came to power. Their strength lies in the "bureaus," in the lower echelons of government, not in mass support. And Communist power, as already noted, is moving ahead unchecked. If there is a curb on the dogmatic spirit it will come only as a result of four circumstances:

1. The need to maintain cordial relations with Latin America and its intelligentsia.

2. The fact that Cuba is closer to the Soviet Union, which is in the process of liberalization itself, rather than to China; and that Khrushchev no doubt wants to make of it a showplace that can attract the rest of the hemisphere away from the United States.

3. The essential humanism of the leaders of the July 26th Movement, especially Castro himself.

4. The current plans for a new, unified, single party in which the Communists may be engulfed and subordinated. Castro himself will head this party.

The Cuban revolutionaries, I feel confident, will do everything in their power to avoid terror—not only because of their own predilections, but because to do otherwise would lose them tons of support where they need it most, in Latin America.

As for the planned new party, no one as yet is clear which way that will jump. Non-Communist intellectuals consider it a means by which Castro will curb Communist power; perhaps here too the wish is father to the thought. An Asian intellectual who was born in Cuba and has many Communist friends told me they were very much concerned that this marked the beginning of their decline. On the other hand, Castro in recent months has been increasingly leaning on Blas Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the two main Communist leaders, for advice. The unified party can, under certain circumstances, be a vehicle for more, rather than less, Communist—and dogmatic—control.

The Cuban revolution is clearly at a turning point. If the United States were to re-establish diplomatic relations and even a minimum of trade, it is certain that the dogmatic influences would decline rapidly. If President Kennedy really wanted to strike a blow at communism, one prominent Cuban writer—also disturbed by the situation—told me: "He could do it in ten minutes by reopening his embassy here. The Communists would fight it and lose ground; Fidel would agree to it immediately and undercut them. After all, we can remain friendly to Russia without a Communist movement internally. Nasser has done it. So have others."

To the extent that the United States continues its embargo and political offensive, the dangers within Cuba intensify. We as a nation have it within our hands, even now, to strengthen the most important humanistic revolution in Latin American history. We can also, by our vulgar and sterile anti-communism, help the Cuban Communists win the greatest victory possible—to take over a revolution they opposed, from the hands of the non-Communists who made it.

PEACE INFORMATION EDITION →

Normally, **Fellowship's** Peace Information Edition, published on the 1st and 15th of each month, is devoted to current news and comment. In this issue we present instead an announcement for which space could not otherwise have been found. The regular format of this Edition will be resumed with the next issue.

Europe in 1962

With the FOR's Peace Seminar

Been waiting till just the right time to make that long-thought-about trip to Europe? Maybe this is what you've been waiting for: the chance to meet top peace leaders, come to grips with peace problems in Europe, while traveling with congenial companions and getting in the indispensable sightseeing, too. And all of it, thanks to the law's provisions for charter flights by bona fide groups, at far less than commercial rates.

Leaves August 2

Participants will travel in a chartered giant new turbo-prop jet, leaving New York August 2, returning September 7. They will take part in:

- A 10-day Peace Seminar in London's New College, with top leaders from Parliament, the Church, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the Committee of 100, British and International FOR.
- A 10-day Peace Seminar in an 800-year-old Abbaye near Paris, with Continental peace leaders.
- A 14-day conducted tour through France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland.

L'Abbaye de Royaumont, near Paris. The 12th Century abbaye will be scene of Continental Peace Seminar August 3-13.

- A 37-day youth tour, with stops at the British FOR Youth Conference, in Amsterdam with Dutch FOR leaders, at an IFOR workcamp in Central Italy, and at the famous Waldensian youth center Agape, high in the Italian Alps.
- Or...just a round trip flight to Europe and your own itinerary there.

Different Choices Available

Combinations of the above have been set up as Trips I, II, III and IV, at prices ranging from $295 (round-trip flight only) to $761 (37-day seminar-conducted tour combination). Trips will be under the leadership of American FOR staffmembers, and will be preceded by a one-day orientation session at FOR headquarters in Nyack, New York.

Agape, retreat center for youth maintained by the Waldensian churches at Prali, near Torino, Youth group will spend a week at the alpine center.

Members and Families Only

Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board restrict passage on such flights to bona fide members of the Fellowship (as of January 30, 1962) and members of their immediate families. Because more applications are expected than the capacity of the plane, vacancies will be filled in the order of receipt, with allowance for mailing time from distant points.

Full details, including application blanks, are available on request.

TRIP I -- LONDON PEACE SEMINAR -- $350*

Plus 27 days your own travel

Limit -- 40 persons

$350 includes

1. One-day orientation session at Nyack headquarters of FOR.
2. Round trip transportation from New York.
3. Room, breakfast and lunch at New College, London.
4. Registration fees for London seminar.
5. Day-long orientation tour of London by chartered coach.
6. Overnight trip by chartered coach to Oxford and Stratford-on-Avon, including ticket to Stratford performance.

Does NOT include

1. Sightseeing costs and evening meals in London.
2. Any expenses for the period August 13 - September 7.
3. Personal insurance.

The Seminars

At New College August 3-13
Sessions in morning; afternoons and evenings free for sightseeing, shopping, theater, etc.
Discussion Leaders include: *Canon L. John Collins (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), E. Philip Eastman (International FOR), top leaders of labor, church, peace movement.*

TRIP II -- PARIS AND LONDON SEMINARS -- $486*

Plus 14 days your own travel

Limit -- 40 persons

$486 includes

1. One-day orientation session at Nyack headquarters of FOR.
2. Round trip flight from New York to Paris.
3. Transportation to the Abbaye de Royaumont.
4. Room and board at the Abbaye from August 3 - 13.
5. Room, breakfast and lunch at Campbell Hall, London, August 27 - September 7.
6. Day-long orientation tour of Paris by chartered coach.
7. Day-long orientation tour of London by chartered coach.
8. Registration fees, both seminars.
9. Overnight trip by chartered coach to Oxford and Stratford-on-Avon, including ticket to Stratford performance.

Does NOT include

1. Expenses between August 13 - 27.
2. Transportation from Paris to London.
3. Evening meals in London, August 27 - September 7.
4. Personal insurance.

The Seminars

Abbaye de Royaumont, August 3-13
Campbell Hall, London, August 27-September 7.
Sessions at Royaumont, alternating morning and afternoon.
Free time for sightseeing, shopping etc. in Paris.
Discussion leaders include: Pastor Jean Lasserre, André Trocme, Heinz Kloppenburg, other top leaders of labor, church, peace movement.
Led by John C. Heidbrink, Assoc. Sec'y, American FOR.

TRIP III -- YOUTH SEMINAR -- $678*

37 Days -- All Expenses

Limit -- 15 persons, ages 17-22 inclusive.

$678 *includes*

One week in Birmingham, England with British FOR youth group.

Six-day tour of Amsterdam, Munich, Venice.

One-week International FOR Work Camp at Rapolla, Italy.

One-week Fourth International Conference, Agape, Prali, Italy.

Six-day tour of Geneva and Paris.

Led by Brewster Kneen, Student Secretary, American FOR; Anita Hicks, IFOR London Staff member; Franco Perna, IFOR Youth Secretary.

RAPOLLA SEMINAR

At the Rapolla Seminar, the American youth group will meet with young people from several European countries. This is a social-recreational center for Italian youth from small villages in the area. The Seminar will include morning work periods with afternoons devoted to informal discussion and recreation.

AGAPE SEMINAR

The Fourth International Conference of the Agape Youth Center of the Waldensian Churches, will bring together young people from Europe and North Africa. The Camp, directed by FOR member Giorgio Girardet, has conferences during the entire year. This particular conference will confront Christians with their responsibilities in international relations.

TRIP I-A -- $655* TRIP II-A -- $761*

Limit -- 40 Persons

An optional all-expense trip for members of Trips I and II. Includes all of Trip I and II provisions, plus 14-day guided tour by chartered bus to Strasbourg, Garmisch, Innsbruck, Bolzano, Venice Florence, Pisa, Sestri Levante on the Riviera, Milan, Lugano, Interlaken, Dijon, Chartres and London.

Led by John C. Heidbrink, Assoc. Sec'y, American FOR.

TRIP IV -- $295*

Limit -- 60 persons

$295* includes

One-day orientation session at Nyack headquarters of FOR.

Flight from New York to London or Paris and return.

Members who take this trip will make their own plans for the entire five-week period.

**The listed prices are estimates based on expected costs. If costs are lower than anticipated, rebates will be made.*

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE SEMINARS

Q: Who can go on the tour?
A: Bona fide members of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (as of January 30, 1962) or members of their immediate families.

Q: Did the FOR make this ruling?
A: No. This is a ruling of the Civil Aeronautics Board covering chartered flights such as the one we plan.

Q: Are there any alternative trips?
A: No. The four trips outlined in this brochure and the option listed constitute the complete program. No alternate plans may be permitted.

Q: Are children half-fare?
A: There are no special rates for children. All seats are pro-rated and each seat will cost the same.

Q: What about insurance?
A: Travel-accident insurance policies such as those sold at air terminals will be available. The FOR can send forms to those who desire it. There will also be an agent on hand at Nyack during orientation for this purpose. (The FOR will arrange the tour for the convenience of its members, but will ask participants to waive any claims against it for injury, damage, loss or delay connected with the trip. The contracting carriers will, of course, carry all normal insurance provisions.)

Q: Will any meals be served on the plane?
A: The carrier will provide two hot meals during the flight.

Q: How do passengers get to Nyack for orientation?
A: Transportation from home to New York City will be provided by the passenger. Chartered buses will leave the Port Authority Bus Terminal (42nd St. and 8th Ave.) in New York City at 9:30 a.m. August 2, 1962 to bring passengers to Nyack. This bus service is included in the listed price.

Q: How long is the orientation and how do passengers get from Nyack to the airport?
A: The orientation will begin at 11:30 and the group will leave by chartered bus for the airport at 4:30.

Q: Will any meals be served at Nyack?
A: There will be a luncheon meal served and a snack before leaving for the airport.

Q: Are the listed prices all-inclusive?
A: No. Prospective participants should make careful note of what is and what is not included.

(1) All prices include the pre-trip orientation session and round trip air transportation to London or Paris, leaving New York August 2, returning from Europe September 7.

(2) Trip I price includes room, all seminar costs, two meals daily. London orientation trip and overnight visit to Oxford and Stratford-on-Avon, August 3--13.

(3) Trip II price includes above in London August 27--September 7, plus all costs of Paris seminar August 3--13.

(4) Trip III (youth) is all inclusive for full 37 days.

(5) Trip IV includes only orientation session and round trip air transportation.

(6) Trips IA and IIA include provisions of Trips I or II plus all expenses of 14-day conducted tour.

NEXT STEPS-- *If you would like to take advantage of this unique opportunity for study and travel with the Fellowship of Reconciliation, decide which trip interests you and write for an application blank. Write to: FOR PEACE SEMINARS--1962, Box 271, Nyack, New York.*

Goodbye, America

BY JOHN H. DAVENPORT

LET'S FACE IT. I'm running. I'm taking my family and I am leaving the good old U.S.A. Incidentally, so are a lot of other people, I am told. I was talking to a young lady at one of the consular offices here in the center of the world and the United Nations, and she said, "Yes, we are running about three or four months behind on our work in processing applications for permanent entry—what with the world situation and everything, you know." So I have got company. And they have company, too.

What kind of company have they got? Well, I am a child of God, and an American citizen. In neither case is it through conscious choice. I am part of God's creation—and I happen to have been born in Illinois. But through choice I am a patriot—or at least through training and habit and compliance with custom. At any rate, I was surprised to find that I had a big lump in my throat—and wet eyes—the other day when I was re-reading Edward Everett's story of "The Man Without a Country"—Philip Nolan. And if any of you are city dwellers who have never had a chance to see a blue ridge of Rocky Mountains rising along a wide horizon twenty miles away—with nothing between you and them but clear, clean air—try it sometime. Go out into America's wide open spaces. Look at your country—just the sheer physical size of it. Even when you are crawling along one of the turnpikes, your tiny automobile reaches a crest or rounds a wide sweeping curve and you see those green-covered slopes and valleys cradling miniature farm-houses, doesn't something happen to you inside? Something does, to me. This is my country, I say to myself. This open sky, this rich green land, is mine. And I feel big and open and wonderful myself.

Of course, this is silly. It's not "my" country. It's God's if it's anybody's. I would like it to be there for everyone in the world to share. I would even like some of my fellow citizens—oddly enough, they seem to be the city-dwellers, usually—to share some of this open-handed beauty, instead of being cramped and crabby and selfish and suspicious of their next-door neighbor across the hall from them or down the street.

But I'm leaving all this. I've never been out of the country before. (I don't count driving through Ontario a couple of times to get from Michigan to New York or vice versa.) And now I am leaving. What would make me want to run away?

Is it cowardice? Cowardice is the opposite extreme from foolhardiness. Between the vice of cowardice and the vice of foolhardiness lies the virtue of courage. In a speech before the annual meeting of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in December 1960, Sir Charles P. Snow, professor of physics from Great Britain and the author of novels about scientists, said: "We know, with the certainty of sta-

tistical truth, that if enough of these weapons are made . . . some of them are going to blow up. Through accident, or folly, or madness—but the motives don't matter."

Relying only on the evidence of one's own common sense and seeing the utter absence of any indication of sanity on the part of the holders of political and military power in the world, can anyone seriously doubt the correctness of Professor Snow's statement? From this conclusion, one need only make the further conclusion that there is a high probability of the involvement of the United States of America in such an explosion, to arrive at the final conclusion that the continental United States will be subject to nuclear attack, and that outlying territories and possessions having military or naval installations will also be targeted.

In 1946, at public hearings one of the atomic scientists who testified said, "The only defense against atomic bombs is not to be where they land." A wealth of published evidence since that statement fifteen years ago, only underlines the essential correctness of the statement. All that the evidence adds is a qualitative dimension. For "where they land" has now spread out to include areas three or four hundred miles downwind of the precise point of "Ground Zero."

"Whither Then Shall I Flee"

One may then reasonably conclude that "there is no place to hide" in the United States or any of its territories and possessions. "Whither then shall I flee?" asks the Psalmist. But answers are slow and slower in coming—as technological achievement overshadows technological achievement. In this context, who is a coward? Who is brave? Who is foolhardy? Perhaps in this context, the whole question is meaningless. For what place have human virtues and vices in such a situation? There must be a choice open to you—and in this situation, you have no choice. You must stay right where you are until the awful event happens and then you must die. You cannot prevent its happening. Most probably it will be an "accident"—or perhaps someone in a position to start the holocaust will be overcome by the sheer psychological pressure of such a great responsibility; he will panic; or go "temporarily insane"; and it will "happen." What can you do under these circumstances? You are helpless. You have no choice. And with no choice to make, you can be neither cowardly nor brave nor foolhardy. You are expendable. Or at least eighty million of us Americans are expendable—and, I suppose, a roughly similar number of Russians—and any other people who happen to be "downwind" from our countries.

Unfortunately, I do have a choice. I can stay and do whatever is possible for one person to do to prevent "the war that nobody wants." Or I can run—somewhere else—and do whatever is possible there for one person to do to prevent the war that nobody wants. Not everyone can leave—physical, financial or other commitments prevent them. But I can leave—and I must make the choice.

When God created me, He implanted an instinct of survival in me. When He created me, he gave me the power of procreation—and the capacity of loving and protecting my own offspring. And when He created me, He gave me the power of fellow-feeling and love for His whole creation, and especially for mankind itself. Therefore I see my choices in this framework—loyalty first and foremost to God, my Creator; respect for myself, His creation, and a determination not deliberately to permit its destruction; respect and love, thirdly, for the children of my loins and for the mother of my children; and finally, love and respect

for mankind—my fellow friends, co-religionists, citizens and strangers—whomever and wherever they may be in this fragile World.

Divine Law will not permit me to choose suicide—but many saints of the Church and outside of it have permitted themselves to be sacrificed unresisting in order to witness to the truth of God's love. So though I may not kill myself by my own hand, may I nonetheless not permit others to take my life to advance the cause of Truth? May I not stay in this country in the face of certain death—when leaving it would permit me to extend the time of my death—in order to continue the fight for world peace and brotherhood and the establishment of the reign of law and order among lawless nations in the world? Here in my own country, where I am known and have status and am respected? This is a debatable question—maybe yes, maybe no. It is a matter of practical judgment. Perhaps I could be more effective in some other smaller land, where one individual counts for more than in the vast United States. We know that the voter in Nevada has much more weight in the Senate of the United States than the voter in New York or California. Perhaps the same sort of weighted constituency could become effective in small lands like Ghana, Malagasy, Costa Rica, Ecuador or New Zealand.

Am I Running Out On Friends

One thing troubles me. Am I not "running out" on my friends, my fellow-workers in this country for a peaceful, loving world? Am I not running out on my fellow American citizens?" Thomas Mann, I am told, was not welcomed back into Germany after the war against Hitler whom he fled in the early 1930's. Will my fellow-countrymen welcome me back if the danger of war is finally averted by the formation of a world government with power to imprison its Hitlers, its Khrushchevs, its Kennedys and de Gaulles? Is this the sacrifice I must make for the peace of the world and the survival of my family? And if so, is it worth it?

One of the reasons for this essay is to give these friends of mine—as many of them as possible—an opportunity for once in their lives to act as free men—and the only free men are those who ACT freely—and decide for themselves whether they will go or whether they will stay. This is more than my obligation to them. They have the same information I have—or they could have gotten it, if they had felt concerned. If they stay, then at least they have made a free choice—as I have made mine in choosing to find a better vantage point for the struggle against tyranny. There is still a little time left to choose—I don't know myself whether there is enough. This is an appeal to them to choose—with open eyes—one way or another. To drift blindly is also to choose, they will find.

So there you have it. The creation of a new class of refugees—the refugees of World War III—to add to all the homeless, wandering reminders of man's hate for man that the other wars of our century have created. How long, O Lord, how long?

Back in 1939 as an undergraduate I learned a hymn as a chorister in the chapel choir—and only fragments of the words can I remember now. One couplet still sticks in the mind more than twenty years later:

> "Turn back, O Man, forswear thy foolish ways;
> Old now is Earth, and numbered are her days . . ."

The chapel was a huge one, in the neo-Gothic style, and our young voices filled its light-pierced gloom . . .

"Age after age till God's whole Will be done." Lord, give us the courage and wisdom to play our part in fulfilling Thy Will.

War and Peace —and BERLIN

BY FRED WARNER NEAL

TODAY, IN THE THERMONUCLEAR AGE, war or peace not only means victory or defeat; war or peace today means survival or extinction. One cannot talk sanely about any problem in international relations—let alone Berlin—unless this cardinal fact is kept in mind.

Now under what conditions does one sanely undertake extinction? Under what conditions does one consider certain death? There may be those, employing the grisly neo-logic and neo-morality of Herman Kahn and the Rand Corporation, who debate about what survival of a thermonuclear holocaust means; whether it means 100 million killed or only 50 million. But I am not among them. Such debate has all the reality of medieval polemics about how many angels on the head of a pin. It is quite true that, if there were a thermonuclear war, some Americans might survive—perhaps millions—although under what conditions of fallout and radioactivity one can only speculate in horror. Some might survive, but I defy any sane and honest person to challenge me when I say that under no possible, conceivable circumstances could the American system of democracy and humanism and free private enterprise survive a thermonuclear war. The apparent failure of American public leaders to understand this fact is perhaps the greatest danger we face, and the failure of American public leaders to make it clear to our people is their most awful dereliction of duty.

Berlin and the Question of War

Now, does this mean that under no conceivable conditions one should risk thermonuclear war? I respect those who answer in the affirmative, but I cannot agree. I can conceive of conditions in which a thermonuclear war—with all its immorality and horror and illogic—should be risked. Some, but not very many. But that there may be any at all only testifies to the madness of the world we live in. Essentially, the only conditions under which it would ever be permissible to risk thermonuclear war would be those in which a vital interest of the United States was threatened, in which our security was directly menaced. This is one reason —and the most important one—why a review of what constitutes vital American interests, of what constitutes a menace to our security, is long overdue.

I am profoundly convinced there is no conceivable justification for considering that Berlin today rationally involves the question of peace or war.

I do not doubt the honesty of those of our leaders who tell us that it does. But I do doubt their ability, their judgment, their knowledge, their objectivity and their sense of perspective and proportion. They are, after all, the same men who were telling us just a few short months ago that the problem of Laos presented to us the question of war or peace—the problem of Laos, that was created originally by American intervention to overthrow a constitutionally established and popularly supported government. The problem of Laos is now fading to obscurity because those people who told us that it involved the question of war or peace are accepting the same government whose overthrow we originally accomplished, and are abandoning the regime for which they told us we might have to go to war. Those people who are telling us Berlin involves the question of war or peace are the same people, also, who so sadly compromised us in Cuba an even shorter time ago because they do not know how to recognize a social revolution when they see one and seem to know as little about communism as they do about international politics, which is very little indeed. Must I now accept without question the judgment of these same men that whether I and my family, and you and your families, and we and our country, and our society and its civilization, live or die is to be determined by what happens in Berlin?

I agree just as much as anyone that we should not give in to the Soviet Union, or to anybody else, where our vital interest, our security, is at stake. And I agree that we should not let ourselves "be pushed around by the Russians." But the truth is that our vital interest and our security are not involved in Berlin and that the Russians are not "pushing us around." A great deal of contrary talk is coming out of Washington these days, and this then becomes the basis for even wilder newspaper talk. If any of this has any other purpose than to whip up a war hysteria, I don't know what it is. Very few people, here or elsewhere, who accept this extreme view of the matter, even know what the Russians are really proposing about Berlin.

What the Russians Want

We would be perfectly right in refusing to be "pushed out of Berlin," but the Russians are not proposing this. We are right, too, in feeling that we have commitments to the West Berliners—"the freedom-loving West Berliners—to save them from communism," as the saying goes. Having made so loudly and so often these commitments—whether they are wise or not—we cannot, of course, suddenly ignore them now. But the Russians are not asking for this, either. What the Russians want to do, they say, is to make a German peace treaty that would normalize and formalize their East German State and the Oder-Neisse boundary with Poland, and normalize and formalize the highly abnormal division of Berlin. Specifically, Mr. Khrushchev says, such a treaty could provide for stationing American and other Western troops in West Berlin. It could provide, he says, even that which we don't have now, despite some assertions to the contrary—legal right of access through the territory of East Germany. Do we want this? Or if we don't, why? And what do we want? To answer these questions, it is necessary to look at Berlin in the larger context of Germany.

Origin of the Berlin Problem

The problem of Berlin arose as a result of the four-power occupation of Germany following the defeat of the Nazis. Germany was divided into zones, with the Soviet armed forces controlling the Eastern zone—roughly that area already occupied by them at the end of the war—and two Western

zones, one for the Americans and one for the British; and the Americans subsequently brought in the French, to whom was given control of a part of our original zone. Each military commander was to have absolute authority on political matters in his own zone, subject to the proviso that matters affecting the whole of Germany, especially economic matters, were to be determined by a quadripartite allied control council situated in Berlin. Berlin itself was divided into four sectors, one for each occupying power. And Berlin was deep inside the Soviet zone. There is room for questioning the wisdom of the details of this arrangement, which resulted from the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, and even more room for criticizing the failure of the Americans and their Western allies to obtain a formal agreement guaranteeing them free access at all times to West Berlin, but it does little good to dwell on these points now.

The aim of this arrangement—agreed on by all concerned—was that after taking of reparations and reordering German political and economic life, the four zones would be unified into a single German state. Meanwhile, at Potsdam, the powers agreed to a revision of Germany's eastern borders, in favor of the Poles and the Russians. The boundary tentatively agreed on was roughly along the line of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, with this line to be ratified, give or take a little here or there, by a German peace treaty later. This peace treaty has never been worked out, and that is, in part, what Khrushchev wants now. One reason why there was no peace treaty is that quadripartite control of Germany broke down almost before it began. It is fashionable in the United States to put the blame for this break-down altogether on the Soviet Union, just as it is fashionable in the USSR to put the blame altogether on the United States. Both were guilty, and in just about equal degree. But there was also the disruptive role of the French, who never signed the Potsdam agreement even when they were made an occupying power. Paris insisted that if the USSR and Poland were to get part of Germany on the East, France should get part of Germany on the West. And failing this, the French obstructed the work of the Allied Control Council, which, consequently, was unable to establish all-German political parties, labor organizations, postal system or anything else.

Meanwhile, the Russians—destroyed, impoverished and greedy—began an action which certainly violated the Potsdam agreement in spirit if not in letter: the taking of reparations from their zone of Germany by operating factories on the spot and shipping off all the production to the USSR, rather than by the slower and supposedly agreed upon process of dismantling. This caused a strain on the occupation economy in all zones and had a severe inflationary effect. The West retaliated by reneging on promised reparations shipments from its zones to the USSR. Moscow in turn retaliated by reneging on promised food and fertilizer shipments from its zone to the Western zones. Then the Western powers, perhaps necessarily but still in clear violation of the treaty, adopted a West zonal currency and prepared to merge their three zones into one. It was in retaliation for this that Moscow in 1948 began the Berlin Blockade.

The Cold War Freeze

By now the wartime agreements on Germany were already, as James P. Warburg says, a dead letter. The Cold War was well under way. And the United States was committed to the idea, long propagated by men like the late James V. Forrestal, that it was necessary to build up Germany as a military buffer to Soviet power. To accomplish this, the Western powers, un-

der American leadership, took a fateful step that changed the whole complexion of the German situation. They established their merged Western zones into a new, separate, independent German state—West Germany. Originally the rationale for the Western powers being in Berlin was that this was necessary for quadripartite control and administration of Germany, looking toward a unified German state with Berlin as its capital. The Western action in establishing a West German state brought an abrupt end to this rationale. As many foresaw, the Soviet Union almost immediately followed suit and created an East German state under its domination. There were now two German states, east and west, one as valid and as legal as the other.

At this point some kind of German unification might still have been possible. It was now made virtually impossible, not by Soviet action but by American action in launching the militarization of the West German state. There was already, it is true, a sizable police force in existence in East Germany. While the evidence is that these so-called East German "alert groups" were primarily for the purpose of asserting Communist control, they did provide a nucleus on which an army could be built. But they were not an army. The only real military force in East Germany was the Soviet Army, just as the only real military force in West Germany was the United States Army, backed by British and French troops.

NATO and the Militarization of Germany

The Americans and some of their Western allies, however, were obsessed with fear of Soviet military aggression, with fear that suddenly the Soviet army might begin a march toward the English Channel. I agree with George Kennan and others that such a danger of Soviet military aggression never existed. To guard against it, however, the Americans and their allies organized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO then, as until recently, consisted primarily of American troops and a paper organization. It was apparent that if NATO was ever to be anything else, it would have to have participation by West Germany, already beginning its amazing economic recovery. Accordingly, the Americans took the second fateful step, beginning—against the violent opposition of not only the USSR but many others—the militarization of West Germany. The government of Konrad Adenauer, if not its people, were more than willing. Soon the Soviet Union again followed suit and militarized East Germany.

Now ostensibly our goal was still unification—or by this time, better stated, reunification—of Germany. There was, obviously, only one way this could ever be accomplished, and this was by agreement with the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union made it clear over and over again that it would never agree to reunification if it meant the possibility of a rearmed Germany in NATO. The United States, meanwhile, had oriented its whole European policy around the idea of a strong NATO, which meant German participation. That being the basis of our policy, it followed that we would not agree that a reunified Germany must be excluded from NATO. The result was that there were never—at any time—any real negotiations on German reunification. It is a misstatement of fact bordering on falsehood to say, as Secretary Dulles

and President Eisenhower once said, that the Soviet Union agreed at the 1955 Summit Conference to reunification by free elections and then went back on its pledge. The Soviet agreement was *only* on condition that the reunified German state be excluded from NATO, and to this we would not consent.

Would the Russians ever have agreed to a reunified Germany on terms we could have accepted? Maybe not. But we don't know. In the apt words of George Kennan, "we shall never know whether the Russians will go through an open door until we stop trying to push them through a closed one." The Russians might have consented to a non-communist and neutral reunified Germany because this would have formalized the territorial arrangements in Eastern Europe. Also, it would have removed Western troops from the border of this vital Soviet core interest. And it would have removed from the heart of Europe a problem which, unsolved, constantly threatened to disrupt the peace.

One indication of Soviet willingness to consider this approach was the Soviet endorsement of proposals for mutual disengagement of troops from Central Europe and even from parts of their own Eastern Europe—proposals which we refused to discuss. Another indication is what happened in East Germany. The East German state is, of course, a Soviet puppet, tight under the Soviet thumb, and always has been. But it is highly significant that there had taken place no full socialization in East Germany, of the type that took place in the Eastern European satellites. It was only in 1958, when West Germany was well on its way to full rearmament and completely integrated in the Western system, and when disengagement was turned down as a subject for discussion, that full satellization took place and East Germany became fully integrated into the Soviet bloc and given an equal status with the other satellite states.

Reunification Possibilities Vanish

Up to this time, the rationale for Western presence in Berlin—now no longer legal—was diplomatic. That is, it was a gambit in the politics of reunification, and as such it made sense. Since Berlin was symbolic as the traditional capital of Germany, Western presence there, keeping the city from full Communist influence, might have been a factor in the kind of reunification and in the orientation of a reunified German state. But now reunification was out of the question. No longer did the Russians want it, if they ever did. And the West Germans, and the Americans also, did not want it, no matter what they said; or if they did want it, the methods they pursued—insistence on a reunified Germany in NATO—now more clearly than ever prevented the wish from having any real meaning. This being the case, even the diplomatic rationale for our being in Berlin vanished.

It was at this time that Khrushchev broached the idea of a German peace treaty and an alteration of the situation in Berlin.

The Resurgence of West Germany

West Germany is the strongest nation in Europe, economically and militarily also, if the USSR is excluded. It dominates the Common Market. Among the non-American members, it dominates NATO. And the fact is that West Germany has come also to dominate American policy in Europe.

Now West Germany, just like all other states, has its own interests. These are not American interests except perhaps incidentally. This is entirely natural. But it is not entirely natural that the United States continues to act as though German interests were always and necessarily our own interests. The West made this mistake about Ger-

many once before, after the Locarno Treaty. The British and French actually expected Germany to help them maintain the Versailles Treaty, which was aimed against Germany. Operating on the incredibly naive assumption that because Foreign Minister Stresemann talked a good game of "Western unity," the British and French never suspected that he was, at the same time, beginning the secret and illegal rearmament of Germany that was to have its tragic climax in World War II.

Now I do not think that the West German state is like the Nazi Reich—although it does have many former Nazis in high places—nor that it has intentions of trying to dominate Europe militarily. But I do think that West Germany, in furthering German interests as it sees them, is a provocative, disruptive force which, as much as any other single factor, stands in the way of a peaceful European settlement. In one way, the West German policy has the result—whether or not the intention—of doing exactly what Nazi policy sought to do—which is to cause conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, albeit for different reasons.

Certainly American policy cannot escape some onus here. We do not have to do what the West Germans want us to do. The impact of the war created a profound anti-militarism among Germans, especially young Germans. It is thanks to our own efforts, in part, that they now have a government which is thoroughly militarily oriented and which is steadily becoming more so. This has come so gradually that one is hardly aware of it. I well recall being in Frankfurt and Bonn in 1950, on a mission for the U. S. State Department, when there were newspaper reports that the West German government had a "defense adviser." This was indignantly denied by both the Americans and the Germans, although everybody knew it was true. Then it was admitted, but the West Germans said, solemnly, no defense ministry. A few months later the defense adviser became minister of defense, but, the West Germans said, no army. A few months later there began to be organized a German army, but, said the West Germans, no traditional uniforms and no generals. A few months later the army donned the traditional uniforms and the rank of general was reestablished, but, it was said, no general staff, and so on. About the same time West Germany adopted as its national anthem the infamous "Deutschland Uber Alles," but, it was said, the first verse, containing the offensive words, would not be used. Now the anthem begins, as before, "Deutschland, Deutschland, über Alles." Goethe, in an untypical poetic burst of patriotism, once wrote that when he thought of Germany he could not sleep. It is not surprising that today a great many other people cannot sleep when they think of Germany—but for other reasons.

Why the Bonn Government Refused Postwar Settlements

The provocative aspect of West German policy is illustrated in the altogether unwarranted claim of the Adenauer government to jurisdiction of Berlin. It is illustrated by the refusal to accept the Oder-Neisse line. It is illustrated by the inclusion in the Bonn government of a "minister of all-German affairs" and by West Germany's refusal—backed by the United States—to recognize the East German government and by its use of diplomatic pressure on any state that does recognize it. Perhaps the single largest identifiable

political group in West Germany is the so-called Volksdeutsche, those Germans who fled or were expelled from the Prussian provinces now part of Poland and Russia, from the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia and from other parts of Eastern Europe. They tend to be strident nationalists. What the Volksdeutsche want, of course, is a return to Germany of their property. They are dispossessed and desperate. Officially they abjure thoughts of war. But how they expect to achieve a return of territory from Poland and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, they don't say. These Volksdeutsche are a significant factor in the Bonn government's refusal to accept the postwar settlements. And the West German policy is a significant factor in the American refusal to accept them.

West German policy is not only provocative but arrogantly so. The one hope of a real German settlement might have been military disengagement, and at one point President Eisenhower seems to have considered this idea. But the West German government as much as said, "you can't adopt such a policy"; that is, having rearmed, they were not going to disarm, and the United States couldn't make them. In Claremont, California in 1958 the German Ambassador, Dr. Grewe, publicly defied the United States in this regard. He was not arrogant in tone, but that is the only word for the content of his remarks. He was, as I recall, applauded roundly.



Of course, the West Germans are right. It is now too late; we can't make the Germans disarm if they don't want to. And far from wanting to, they are now demanding nuclear weapons, as they demanded in the past, successfully, operational bases for their troops in Western Europe. One might well ask, "Who won World War II, anyway?"

In the same way, the West Germans are now calling the tune on Berlin and are, in effect, dictating American policy. No compromise on Berlin, the West Germans say. And why? Because Herr Adenauer insists that West Berlin is a part of West Germany. He and his government insist that the East German state has no right to exist. They insist on German unity, by which they simply mean expanding the present West German republic to include all of Germany, including those former parts of Prussia now incorporated into Poland and the Soviet Union. A German peace treaty, such as called for by Khrushchev, would of course "legalize" the division of Germany, would require the *de facto* if not *de jure* recognition of East Germany and would force the West Germans to accept the Order-Neisse line.

Now obviously if the Soviet Union is to be defied on these matters, it will be defied by the United States, not by West Germany. Come on, say the West Germans, let's you defy the Russians. One can excuse the West Germans for taking this line more easily than one can excuse the Americans for falling for it. Is it not time that we have a policy of our own on Berlin and on Germany, reflecting American rather than German interests?

The U.S. Interests in Berlin

Just what American interests are affected by the Soviet proposal on Berlin? To answer this it must first be realized that the present situation in Berlin is highly abnormal and impermanent by its very nature. It is absolute nonsense to talk about this Berlin situation—as Secretary of State Rusk has done—as being part of a "status quo" that must be maintained at all costs. It cannot be maintained indefinitely, no matter what the Russians do or don't do. It is no policy at all to reiterate that we will "stand firm" in such a situation. And it is only soph-

stry to assert—as President Kennedy and others have done—that since the United States is demanding no change in the Berlin situation, the issue arises only because of Soviet trouble-making. Our position in Berlin is untenable militarily, diplomatically and legally. The handful of American troops in the city do not keep the Russians out. If they are kept out by anything other than their own restraint, it is by American nuclear deterrent power. Meanwhile, peace treaty or no peace treaty, we and the West Berliners are at the mercy of the Russians and the East Germans. It is high time we faced up to this unpleasant fact. There are a thousand and one things they could do to make the whole jerry-built structure collapse any time they wanted to. Merely changing the currency system would, as Mayor Brandt has said, bring an economic collapse. Endless examination of passage papers or constant repairs on roads and bridges could halt our access. Are we prepared to go to war over the Communists' right to change their own currency? Or over their right to repair roads and bridges? Or over the extent of their bureaucratic inefficiency?

The fact is that, given the unlikelihood of reunification and given the hard, cold realities of international politics, Berlin ultimately is almost certainly going to become the capital of the state in which it is located—East Germany. But we are not being asked to consider that. Compromises are open to us. One does not have to agree with the Khrushchev proposals to see that the Soviet concern over the present situation is not unnatural. What is the present situation as it must appear to Moscow? A Western enclave ensconced far inside one of their satellite states. West Germany and the United States refusing to recognize East Germany, refusing to accept the Oder-Neisse line, talking about ending Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Even without their paranoia, the Russians might see all this as a threat. The fact is that the Soviet position on Berlin is not extreme, that it has not lacked restraint. Mr. Khrushchev has repeated over a period of years—at times almost plaintively—that he considers the present impermanent arrangement a source of instability in Central Europe and that the USSR attaches great interest to a change.

Germany and U.S. Policy

Actually, it is by no means clear that our position in Berlin might not actually be enhanced by a peace treaty something like the one the Soviet Union proposes. If we want to go to war over our rights in Berlin or over what the Communists might do to the freedom-loving people of West Berlin, we can do so under conditions of a peace treaty as well as we can now. To say that the Soviet proposal does not adversely affect our true interest in Berlin assumes, of course, that our interest is in European stability and reduction of tensions. There can be European stability and reduction of tensions, however, lacking reunification of Germany, only if we—and Bonn—accept the reality of the East German state and the Oder-Neisse line.

On what basis have we thus far refused to accept these realities? The implicit American assumption that we had a right to create a West German state but that the Soviet Union did not have a right to create an East German state is so untenable that we do not even assert it in this fashion, but that is what our position amounts to. Do we expect the Soviet Union to agree with us and, out of the goodness of its heart and love of capitalism, voluntarily turn East Germany over to West Germany and force the Poles to give up their new territories and restore the former Prussian city of Koenigsberg to a Germany controlling NATO? If we don't expect this, what do we expect? What do the

West Germans expect? Presumably we do not intend to try to bring about these changes by force, but can we be sure that, in the present milieu, the Russians—and the East Germans and the Poles—understand this? Actually our policy is based on utter unreality. But can we expect to reassure the Russians by saying, "We know our policy doesn't make any sense, but please believe it just reflects a lack of realism on our part rather than an intention to force changes harmful to your interests"?

No, of course we cannot say this. Nor does our government see it this way. Mr. Rusk recently referred to what he called "the many contradictions and historical fallacies in the present position of the Soviet leaders [on Germany]." As one who accepts and defends the policies of Secretaries Acheson and Dulles on Germany, Mr. Rusk ought to know a lot about contradictions and historical fallacies. But sometimes too much of a concern with the mote in the eyes of others obscures the mote in one's own eye.



There has been a lot of talk about taking the initiative away from the Communists, and this is long overdue. The present Berlin situation would be a good place to start. Indeed, if we are not prepared to risk war in a vain attempt to preserve a "status quo" that cannot be preserved and does not involve our vital interest in any event, and if we do not wish to accept that Soviet proposal, there is no alternative to taking the initiative. And in one sense that is just what Khrushchev is inviting us to do. Maybe we can't come up with a workable proposal, but we will never know until we try.

There are a number of obvious proposals that could be made. Senator Mansfield has offered one—creating a united Berlin as a free city guaranteed by both NATO and Warsaw Pact and policed by "international peace teams." The Mansfield proposal may not be altogether realistic, but it is, at least, a proposal. Another would be demilitarization of both East and West Berlin, with the latter in a special status. United Nations supervision of West Berlin is also a possibility. A joint East-West German condominium of the whole of Berlin is still another, and this by no means exhausts the possibilities. But if we are to have anything better than the Russians suggest, we must take the lead and propose something.

The West Germans, of course, will not like it. It is high time, I think, that the West Germans be put in their place on this matter. It is high time that American policy assert itself in behalf of real American interests, not imagined American interests or West German interests. I can think of no better place to start than for our national leaders to make realistic rather than propaganda statements about the whole issue to the American people. It is such a course that takes real courage, rather than the pseudo courage about standing firm and going to war, and it is real courage alone that will preserve our interests and integrity and at the same time spare us a thermonuclear war. Which kind of courage our present leaders have, we may be soon about to see.

BOOKS

More Fear than Faith

IN PLACE OF FOLLY by Norman Cousins. Harper 1961. 224 pp., $3.

America's principal exponent of nuclear pacifism is Norman Cousins, of SANE and other causes and of *The Saturday Review*. In *In Place of Folly* he has written both his diagnosis of and his therapy for the war problem. He has added several inspirational essays designed to motivate his readers to energetic civic action.

What should be said first is that *In Place of Folly* is an intelligent and a warmhearted book. If men in either government or the street could be brought to read these pages and to agree with their author, folly would decline and the chances of peace improve.

The first several chapters constitute a primer on the powers and horrors of weapons developed since the last days of World War II—nuclear bombs, missile systems, and CBR (chemical-biological-radiological) instruments. This is all clear and well informed, and culminates in a chapter entitled "Power Without Control."

Cousins then proceeds from diagnosis to therapy—world peace through law; more precisely, through a strengthened United Nations. Here he cites approvingly the proposals made by Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn. In a chapter entitled "What About Russia?" Cousins says that since the alternative to a strengthened UN "is likely to be no world at all," there is "a reasonable hope" that Russia may consider such a United Nations. There is no chapter entitled "What About the United States?"—or "What About China?"

Especially in the rather discursive concluding chapters, Cousins raises the moral issue with considerable fervor. But his book appeals more to fear than to conscience, relies more on law backed by force than on spirit. Law, he says, "never allows potential violators to become stronger than the machinery to deal with violators."

Like the majority of his fellow countrymen, Cousins is too faithless and too fearful to say, "Let us raise a standard to which the wise and honest can repair; the event is in the hands of God." Cousins' book as a whole does not transcend prudential worldly wisdom.

There are those of us who believe that in our time the folly of men is so menacing, so criminal, that nothing can displace it short of the foolishness of God which is wiser than men. Is it realistic to share Cousins' hope that the governments of the Soviet Union and the United States will transform the United Nations into a world federation with overwhelming firepower? These governments are little if any more likely to do that than to embrace unilateral disarmament.

The appeal of *In Place of Folly* is for those who are less nearly pacifist than its author, not for those who are more so.

—ALFRED C. AMES

Catalog of Cruelty

A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT by John Laurence. Citadel 1960. 230 pp., $5.

Capital punishment has a most disreputable history. Nearly every method of torture and torment known to man has been employed in its service. Burning alive, boiling in oil, suffocation in a quagmire, impalement, crucifixion, beheading, sawing in two, pulling to pieces by horses, tearing to death with red-hot pincers, burial alive, stoning, throwing from cliffs, drowning, strangulation, etc., etc.—the list goes on and on.

A great variety of cruelties have been visited upon those about to be executed, such as public dissection, boiling, drawing before quartering, starving, disemboweling, dismemberment, breaking bones on the rack and beatings of every description.

Four methods are used now in the United States: the gallows, the electric chair, the gas chamber and the firing squad.

John Laurence catalogues the wretched

AMONG OUR BOOK REVIEWERS: **Alfred C. Ames,** a Chicago newspaper man, has long been a leading figure in the Midwest FOR. **Margaret C. McCulloch** teaches at LeMoyne College in Memphis, Tennessee, and has been an FOR member for years. **Charles C. Walker,** AFSC College secretary, is a former FOR regional secretary. **John Oliver Nelson,** former FOR National chairman, is field work director at Yale Divinity School.

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history of the death penalty, with a brief historical summary. A noted criminologist has called this "a sensational book by a journalist." The lurid character of the book is achieved not by flashy writing but by the unrelieved description of the tortures and executions used in the name of justice.

Reading this book confirmed a belief of this reviewer: that the main purpose of capital punishment is betrayed by its name—punishment. A considerable number of studies have demonstrated that no relation can be shown between the homicide rate and the *presence* or *absence* of the death penalty. However, advocates of the death penalty are singularly unimpressed by figures (they usually call them "fanciful figures" or "so-called statistics").

The debate over the death penalty is again being carried on in quite a few states of the nation. Nine states no longer have capital punishment. Delaware abolished the death penalty in 1958. In the two years since then, the homicide rate has been below that of pre-abolition years.

An essay by Clarence Darrow is included in this book. To those who say that killers forfeit their right to live and should in turn be killed by the State, Darrow said: "I would hate to think I live in a State that I didn't think was better than a murderer." Also included is the eloquent editorial by the New York *Herald Tribune* on the occasion of Caryl Chessman's execution in 1960.

Laurence's book is useful for those working on abolition campaigns, and of interest to the general reader who has the stomach for that sort of thing.

—CHARLES C. WALKER

Symbol of Racial Crisis

LITTLE ROCK U.S.A.: MATERIALS FOR ANALYSIS ed. by Wilson Record and Jane Cassels. Chandler Publishing Co. 1960. 338 pp., paperback, $2.25.

Little Rock U.S.A. is both the title of a new book edited by Wilson and Jane Record, and the symbol of a crisis in human relations which still flags attention around the world. We still ask, "What happened there and why?" So, this timely, well-organized and inexpensive compilation of source materials on Little Rock is certain to be widely welcomed. In our quest for answers to our queries it offers us as

istance, dangerous assistance.

Compiled especially for college students, he materials are in highly convenient form or them. They run chronologically and re not merely provided with necessary ref- rence documentation but even carry direc- ives to the inexperienced on how to foot- ote his paper. For the less academic user, oo, they are well arranged. He will find n them a slightly fragmented but lively ournalistic record with the occasional nsertion of relevant court decisions and ow and then bits of other documents. Any serious student of human relations will certainly want to have this handy olume on his shelf for ready reference.

This is precisely why it is dangerous. It will be too acceptable. Drawn overwhelm- ngly from *Southern School News* with sup- lements from the *Arkansas Gazette* and ow and then some other journalistic ource, it presents us afresh with the view of the matter taken by able Southern white ournalists honestly trying to be objective but steeped in the traditions and values of their region, time, and race, and neces- sarily limited to journalistic glimpses. The depth is too shallow; the perspective is too small; the voices are not diverse enough to give us insight.

The story begins with a bang in 1954 with the U.S. Supreme Court decision of that year and covers almost solely local white reaction to it. The white South's tragic failure to understand its own crisis is due in large measure to precisely this limited perspective in terms of which *Little Rock U.S.A.* is essentially unintelligible. Shorn off, excluded from our view are the his- torical processes that led up to 1954, the world trends, tides, and implications in terms of the United States role in the world of emergent colored nations, the Negroes' points of view, and the essential issues of basic human rights and human dignity, all essential ingredients in the crisis, hence essential to its comprehension. The white South's failure of comprehension thus re- flects itself in the editors' selection and will tend to be confirmed rather than corrected by the widespread use of this volume by students as yet not highly trained in criti- cal evaluation. It is dangerous to believe that we can understand *Little Rock U.S.A.* without reference to these matters. Perhaps

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

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someone will add a companion volume of sources through which these voices may be heard, these perspectives seen. Until such time we are compelled to give this handy little volume a dubious half welcome as dangerous assistance.

—MARGARET C. MCCULLOCH

The Marxist Heresy

CHRISTIANITY AND COMMUNISM TODAY by John C. Bennett (Association Press 1960), 188 pp., $3.50.

So few voices are raised for understanding Communism rather than fighting it, that John Bennett's up-dated (and up-priced) little book continues to be the most suggestive and lucid brief analysis of the complex interrelations between basic ideas of East and West. He sees Marxism as a heresy out of Christian faith (unlike Nazism), and traces alarming parallels between Communist materialism and our American pragmatic brand of the same basic attitude. The "total war" strategy, for example, may well be just a Western reply to, and adoption of, a development of this Communist heresy. Brought up to Eisenhower but not quite to Kennedy, the shafts of light on coexistence and international resistance of Communism are immensely revealing. Professor Bennett (of Union Theological Seminary in New York) is still not *quite* a pacifist again, but his irenic and Incarnational position is just a hairsbreadth away. If FOR members, Freedom Riders, marchers, and missile-defiers are going to be called "Communist," this book is standard equipment for the forthright reply and the intelligent discussion.

—JOHN OLIVER NELSON

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